In this paper, the concept of possibilistic ev idence which is a possibility distribution as well as a body of evidence is proposed over an infinite universe of discourse. The in ference with possibilistic evidence is investi gated based on a unified inference framework maintaining both the compatibility of con cepts and the consistency of the probability logic.
INTRODUCTION
In Dempster-Shafer's theory of evidence (Dempster 1967 , Shafer 1976 ) the concept of basic probability as signment captures the idea that probabilities should be distributed on subsets of the universe of discourse. A basic probability assignment is obtained instead of a classical probability because of the lack of statistics or lack of full knowledge in expert estimations on all the singletons in the universe of discourse. This lack of knowledge is called ignorance (Smets 1991). Ignorance exists universally in the real world.
In practice, it is frequently impossible to carry out statistics directly in order to describe randomness. Even when statistics can be carried out, the number of samples may not be sufficiently large. Estimations from experts are often required or used to estimate uncertainties. Usually, experts cannot provide prob ability distributions or basic probability assignments based on their expertise to estimate randomness. And the expert estimations of random events are usually expressed in natural language propositions. Following is an example:
Example: Suppose that an expert based on his ex perience and observation estimates that a particular target shooter should be "very accurate". The num bers of the rings actually shot may be 10, 9, 8, ... , it is random. The estimation of the expert can be formu lated as a proposition:
p � "The ring number shot ( X)" is "very accurate (F) .
p=XlsF, XE8.
Here, the expert uses the concept "very accurate" to estimate the randomness of the rings actually shot. How the ring numbers 10, 9, 8, ... , are compatible with the concept "very accurate" is fuzzy. Furthermore, the concept "very accurate" must contain some infor mation on the randomness of the ring numbers shot. The question is whether it is possible to extract some information on the probability of the actual ring num bers that will be shot from the fuzzy proposition. We believe that there should exist some connection be tween the two kinds of uncertainties: the randomness of events and the fuzziness of concepts which are used to estimate the randomness. Although the expert's estimation may have come from statistical experience and observation, but it is not sufficient to specify a basic probability assignment. As a result, he can only use language concepts which have fuzzy membership functions in his mind to describe his estimation of the outcome of a random event. Our goal is to extract as much information as possible from propositions ex pressed in a natural language.
The above proposition in the example is called a pos sibility proposition in Zadeh's possibility theory (see (Zadeh 1978 (Zadeh , 1979 etc.). In the possibility theory, the most important interpretation for the possibility is the compatibility of the value a language variable (X) takes with a fuzzy concept. Zadeh pointed out that there exists the following relation:
Probability:::; Possibility
However, there should exist tighter and deeper con nections between the possibility and the probability when the possibility proposition is used to estimate the outcome of random events. In a possibility propo sition, the values taken by the language variable ( X ) constitute a possibility distribution which is a fuzzy subset, i.e. F in the proposition is a fuzzy set. In the theories of random subset coverage or falling shadow proposed by Goodman (Goodman 1982 (Goodman , 1991 and Wang (Wang 1983 (Wang , 1985 , it has been discovered that a fuzzy subset can be represented as the coverage or the falling shadow of a random subset, i.e. the mem bership function of a fuzzy subset, Jl.jo(B) can be expressed as the coverage or the falling shadow function of a random subset, J. Le(8) . Combining the theories in (Goodman 1983 , Wang 1983 , 1985 with the Dempster-Shafer's evidence theory, it can be shown that, in fact, J-te( 8) is the plausibility function on sin
Therefore, we believe that if the fuzzy subset F in the possibility proposition is used to estimate the outcome of a random event, F must contain implicitly a certain amount of information on a (generalized) probability distribution, i.e., a basic probability assignment.
The information provided by a fuzzy subset F through its membership function is, however, only limited to the plausibility function on singletons. Unfortunately, a basic probability assignment cannot be determined uniquely by the plausibility on singletons. There exist many basic probability assignments whose plausibili ties on singletons of the universe of discourse are the same. A rational method is needed to select a ba sic probability assignment from those having the same plausibility function on singletons to express the infor mation of randomness contained in the fuzzy subset F.
The selection should be able to reflect the amount of ignorance in a basic probability assignment. In (Song and Liang et.al 1988 , 1 990,1992 , we proposed the concept of possibilistic evidence. Possibilistic evidence is a possibility distribution (i.e. a fuzzy subset) as well as a body of evidence (i.e. a basic probability assign ment).
More important problems occur in inference. U su ally, in a decision making process, the information on randomness provided by experts ' estimations can not support the decision conclusion directly and infer ence is necessary. The inference required is different from fuzzy inference because the probability implica tion must be considered at all steps, while fuzzy infer ence only concerns with the compatibility of concepts. Of course, since the information estimating random ness is represented in natural language concepts, the inference should also be consistent with the compati bility of concepts.
This paper investigates the following two problems:
1) Extend the concept of possibilistic evidence to an infinite universe of discourse and remove the limita tion that the possibility distributions should be nor mal fuzzy subsets in (Song et aL 1988 (Song et aL , 1990 . The measurability of set-valued mappings will be included in the consideration.
2) Develop a unified framework of logic inference with possibilistic evidence. In this framework both the com patibility of concepts and the probabilistic logic should be maintained consistently in inference. This will en able us to gain a better understanding of the connec tion in inference between the two kinds of uncertain ties, randomness and fuzziness. A variety of different kinds of fuzzy operators and probability relations can be investigated systematically to reveal the underlyInference with Possibilistic Evidence 507 ing relation between fuzzy inference and probabilistic inference.
POSSIBILISTIC EVIDENCE
To extend the evidence theory to an infinite universe of discourse, we define a super-measurable structure on the universe of discourse for the measurability of set-valued mappings.
Definition 2.1(The super-measurable structure) : Let e be the universe of discourse (frame of discernment) , either finite or infinite, and P(e) be the power space consisting of all the subsets of e (including the empty set 0 and e itself). Let .C C P(e) be a subclass of subsets of e, which contains .Co = {{8}!8 E e}, the subclass of all the singleton subsets of e. Let B be a u-algebra generated by .C over e. In addition, for each B E .C, define a £B-type subclass of subsets as e-1 (C) = {w!e(w) E C} E A, for all c E B, is called a random subset over the universe of discourse e. The set of all the random subsets over e is denoted as S(A, B).
If a measurable random subset e : 0 ---+ B makes
P{w!e(w) E B, w E 0} = 1 and K(e) = P{w!e(w) =f.
0, w E 0} > 0, then e is called a basic probability as signment over e. All the basic probability assignments constitute a subclass ofS(A, B), denoted as Sm (A, B).
Proposition 2.3: If e : 0 ---+ B is a basic probability assignment, then {w!e(w) =f. 0,e(w) c A, w E 0} and {w!e(w) ::::> A,w E 0} all belong to the u-algebra A for all A E B. Therefore the following functions are well-defined for each subset C c e (ref. (de F eriet 1982) ):
is called a belief degree (belief function};
is calle9-a plausibility degree (plausibility function), where cis the complement of cine.
Q e (C) = sup P{w!e(w) ::::> A, wE 0}
A:::> C,AEB is called a commonality number (commonality func tion).
In a finite universe of discourse and if K(f.) = 1, the above definitions coincide with the original definition in (Shafer 1976) . According to Shafer's definitions, P l (C) and Bel (C) are respectively the optimistic and the conservative estimations of the probabilities as signed to subset A, where A represents a crisp propo sition. And Q ( C) measures the probabilities that can move freely to every point of A (see (Shafer 1976) ).
Next, we present some concepts in possibility theory to prepare the ground for the investigation of the relation between the evidence theory and the possibility theory. We will simply call B-measurable as measurable. Only measurable fuzzy subsets will be considered in this pa per.
In Zadeh's possibility theory (Zadeh 1978 (Zadeh , 1979 , pos sibility and necessity measure are defined as
IlEA
These definitions are only suitable for normal fuzzy
Otherwise, for some A c e, there may be IIp(C) < N p(C), yielding a contradiction. Therefore we rede fine them as
We use the falling shadow or coverage function of ran dom subsets as a tool to explore the connection be tween the evidence theory and the possibility theory. The formal definition of a falling shadow or coverage function of a random subset is given below. From Definition 2.1 and 2.2, it is certain that JLe(B) exists for all 0 E e.
It can be proved that, for a fuzzy subset F, there exists a falling shadow (or coverage) function of random sub sets JLe(O) representing its membership function P,p(B), and this correspondence is many-to-one. We have Definition 2. 7 e/ ,.., is called an equivalent subclass of falling shadow (or coverage) of random subsets for a (measurable) fuzzy subset F, if it consists of all the (measurable) random subsets having the following properties: if f. E f./"", then
JLe(B) = Jlp ( O ), 0 E e , and K(f.) =sup P,p(B).
DEE>
Under certain mathematical assumption (see As sumption 2.11), we can prove that an equivalent sub class of falling shadow (or coverage) is not empty and, in general, it contains more than one random subset . We have f. E f./"", there are
and
The condition K(f.) = sup9 E E> Jlp(O) can be removed for the third inequality.
The basic probability assignment f.o : 0 --+ B and the corresponding belief, plausibility and commonal ity functions are altogether called the possibilistic evidence induced from the possibility proposition p � X is F,X E e.
From Theorem 2.8, we can conclude that the choice of the possibilistic evidence from the equivalent sub class of falling shadow (or coverage) of random subsets induced by the possibility distribution F assures that the maximum amount of information on randomness from the possibility proposition is extracted. This is based on the belief that the language proposition con tains valuable information of expert knowledge esti mating randomness.
The following definitions are needed to investigate the inference of possibilistic evidence.
Definition 2.9: Suppose (0, A, P) is a probability field, a A -division over 0 is defined as a subclass of subsets of 0: d = { D ;Ii E I } , where I is at most countable, satisfying
The collection of all A-division over 0 is denoted as We assume that all the probability fields in this paper satisfy the following assumption:
Assumption 2.11 The probability field (0, A, P) has its fixed normal net and A is sufficient to B. 
age In uce rom , I.e., or a ., ., "', ere then e: 0-+ B is a (measurable) random subset.
is called the cutting shadow of Gat 8.
:from eo by nega0on,_IS the possibihstiC evidence Ill
IfF is a measurable fuzzy subset, then its membership function J.l p is a (B-) measurable real function. There fore, there exists a sequence of (B-) simple functions
The above sequence of simple functions f n (8) are de fined on the normal net 1) * of (0, A, P) for n 2:: 1. The following transformation maps the binary order of the normal net to a decimal order.
where ( is one to one. Denote
Then The sequence of simple functions f n (8) can be con structed using the following graph: 3.1.6 and 3.1.8, 6 = (2 is also a body of possibilistic evidence.
After making this classification, a series of interesting inference results can be obtained. In this paper, we only investigate the inference involving concepts which belong to either synonymous or antonymous classes as extreme cases. We believe that an appropriate selec tion of the universe of discourse can ensure the con cepts involved in inference to be limited to beloging to two classes which are antonymous in implication to each other. The rest of the concepts involved can be obtained through combination. We will investigate this topic in another papers.
UNION AND INTERSECTION OPERATIONS, CORRELATION OF THE KNOWLEDGE INFORMATION SOURCES
When two possibility propositions p 1 � X is F1, X E The structure of the combined probability field affects the results of inference. Especially, different combined probability measure P12 ' s produce different results of inference. First, we introduce the following definitions:
Definition 3.2.2: Let Vi= {dl n) } c V(111> A1) and V� = {d� n) } C V(112,A2) be the normal nets of The combined probability field (111 X 112, A1 X A2' Pd should also satisfy Assumption 2.11, i.e., it has its combined net Vi 2, and A1 x A2 is sufficient to B.
There are three specific combined probability measures P12 that are of particular interest: Definition 3.2.3: If for any n ;?: 1 and every element f d
P12 is said to be positively correspondent and is de noted as P{;.
P12 is said to be independent and is denoted as P{ 2 • { 1
P12 is said to be negatively correspondent and is de noted as Pi2 ·
All the results of inference induced from Pi';, P{ 2 and P;2 will be denoted by +, I and -, e.g., J-tt"6 (B), K1(e1 V6), Bele 1 -e 2 (C), etc. All results without sup script represent those induced from other P{ 2 s.
The normal net of a probability fi eld is a sequence of finer and finer subdivisions of this probability space. It induces an order on the sample space. The order is fixed according to Assumption 2.11. This order in duces an embedding of the sample space into the unit interval. Having two probability spaces of this kind, their normal nets define an embedding of the product sample space into the unit square. The measures P{;, P;2 and P{2 correspond to the uniform distribution on the main diagonal, the uniform distribution on the secondary diagonal, and the uniform distribution over the unit square, respectively. If we consider that the probability fields are the sources providing the knowl edge information, the way the combined probability is distributed reflects the correlation between the two information sources. If the information sources are individual experts, the correlation of the information sources then depends on the background, experience, personality, etc. of the experts. Considering the fuzzy subsets included in the possibility propositions as "soft constraints" on the values taken by the language vari able ( X), the order imposed by the normal net on a probability fi eld represents the degree of "tightness" or "looseness" of the soft constraints. For two concepts which are synonymous in implication, P{; implies that the opinions of the two experts on the degree of the soft constraints are similar, and P 1 2 means that the opin ions are adversary, and vise versa for concepts which are antonymous in implication. Therefore, the correla tion of the knowledge information sources represented by the relation between the orders of constraints is the correlation of the experts' perception of the concepts. Based on this understanding, we have for all c c e. If 6 and 6 are induced from two con cepts F1 and F2 which are antonymous in implication, the direction of the inequalities should be reversed.
The logical implication of Theorem 3.2.5 is interest ing and agrees with intuition. A special case of P{;
is that (i11,A1,P1) = (il2,A2,P2) which implies that the two knowledge information sources (the two ex perts) are the same one. In this case, the implication of Theorem 3.25 is obvious.
The condition required in Theorem 3.2.5 is satisfi able, e.g., if either F1 or F2 is a normal fuzzy subset, there will be K-(e12) = K+(e 12) = 1. For the intersection operation e12 � 6 1\ 6, unfor tunately, there exists no similar relation like those in Proposition 3.2.4 and Theorem 3.2.5. However, we have:
Theorem 3.2. 7: If e1 and e2 are induced from two concepts F1 and F2 which are synonymous in implica tion, there is
and for the two concepts which are antonymous to each other, the direction of the inequalities is reversed.
Corollary 3.2.8: For two concepts F1 and F2 which are synonymous in implication, there is J-t"i (e)� J-t< (e)� J-tf (e),
\12 \12 \12
for all () E e. And if F1 and F1 are antonymous in implication, the direction of the inequalities should be reversed.
The term in the center of all the above inequalities in the propositions and theorems includes the case in duced by P{ 2 as a special one. The case for more than two bodies of evidence will be discussed in another paper. Ge, 2l·(w,,w2) = {(Ol>02)I(w1,w2,01,02) E Ge,,},
respectively.
Suppose 6(w1) � Gff, , l-w, : 01 -+ 81 is the pos sibilistic evidence induced from a priori proposition P 1 � X is F1, X E 81, where Gj. is the graph con structed as in 3.1. We define the following operation:
called the extending of 6 from 3(A1, B!) to 3(A1, 81 x 82) (it is similar to the refining in (Shafer 1976) ).
After extending, the conditional proposition is trans fered into the product universe of discourse 81 X 82, becoming Pl. whose property also depends on the selection of the combined probability measure P12. where G{ , l ·w , = (01 X 81 X 82)/G{,. We have:
G_2 is a basic probability assignment.
We have the following relations in two-dimension sim ilar to those in one dimension. Note: X and Y may be the same language variable, el and 82 may be the same universe of discourse, all the propositions and theorems in Subsection 3.3 hold for these special cases.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

POSSIBILITY INFERENCE AND PROBABILITY INFERENCE
In Section 3, we constructed a unified framework for the inference with possibilistic evidence. On this framework, the inference is carried out as probability inference. In Zadeh's possibility theory, possibility in ference is carried out as fuzzy inference because possi bility is interpreted as compatibility with (fuzzy) con cepts. Many fuzzy inference operators were proposed for specific situations. On the framework developed in 3, many fuzzy inference operators can be interpreted by taking different combined probability measures P 12.
We have These are the probability sum and product operators in fuzzy inference;
3)
fl"i (B)= min{ fl6((;1) + fl€2(B), 1} ;
These are the bounded sum and bounded difference op erators in fuzzy inference.
)
This is Lukasiewiez inference operator.
5)
This is the probability inference operator.
6)
This is Zadeh's conditional inference operator.
If F1 and F2 are antonymous in implication, then fl + should be changed to f l -(vise versa for fl-) in all the above equations.
From Proposition 4.1, we can conclude that the pos sibility inference and the probability inference can be unifi ed on our framewok. The inference discussed in Section 3 maintains both the compatibility of concepts and the consistency of probability logic. Especially, 1.e. F U F = 0 and F n F = 0 , for P 12.
Belf11,6(C)
Because we consider P{; as positive correlation be tween the two knowledge information sources in (union and intersection) combination inference, including the case of the two sources being the same one, Corollary 4.2 agrees with intuition.
COMPATIBILITY WITH CONCEPTS AND IGNORANCE ON RANDOMNESS
The membership function fl p (B) = JLe (B) and the com monality number Q e( C) may be considered as the compatibility of the values taken by the language vari able X with the concept F. In our investigation of in ference, we have found that, in certain cases, the more compatible with concepts the values the language va ri able takes (i.e., the larger the membership function or the commonality number of the value taken by the variable), the less valuable the results obtained by in ference, and vise versa. For example, the intersection of two concepts F1 and F2, which are synonymous in implication and are provided by two negatively corre lated knowledge information sources, seems to be more valuable than that obtained from positively correlated sources, but we have Q -:: (C) $ Qi (C) for all C C 8 e 12
'1"
and J.l:: (0) $ J.lt (B) for all(} E e. Similar examples €12 . 6:� .
. . . . can be found m almost all the mequahties m SectiOn 3. Could we conclude that the smaller the member ship function (or commonality number) of a fuzzy set, the greater the information value it contains? Then, the empty set would contain the greatest information value. In the general sense, an emptyset does not con tain any useful information. This seems to be a para dox. The problem is how to measure the randomness information value of inference results. It is reason able that, the less the ignorence, the more valuable is the information on randomness. Therefore, the differ ence between Plausibility and Belief, Pl( C) -Bel( C) , may be an approriate measure. This is suitable for union and conditioning operations and consistent with the concept of inclusion for random sets proposed by Prade 1986, 1991; Yager 1986; Delgado and Moral 1987) . However, it is not suitable for intersection operation. From a measure theory viewpoint, the belief function may be considered as an inner measure, and the plausibility function may be considered as an outer measure. In the case of the possibilistic evidence, these measures are induced by the constraints J.l e (B) = J.li'(B), (} E 8.
This view provides an interesting connection with the measurability of subsets. Some researchers have paid attention to this topic, e.g. (Fagin and Halpern 1991) . We believe that the measurability of a subset (propo sition) is closely related to the grain size or resolution of the properties specifying the subsets.
COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY OF INFERENCE
It is difficult to determine the correlation between the knowledge information sources. It is also diffi cult to determine whether concepts are synonymous or antonymous in their implicat, ions. In spite of these, the inequalities obtained in Section 3 provide the bounds of inference results (Note: Even when two concepts cannot be determined to be synonymous or antony mous in implication, inequalities similar to those in Section 3 can be obtained with a little revision, i.e., the bounds on inference results still hold). Proba bility inference, especially, the combination inference for evidence (e.g., using Dempster's Rule of Co mbi nation), usually has a high computational complexity.
To carry out the combination in an infi nite universe of discourse, the amount of computation needed tends to grow exponentially with the accuracy required. It would be impossible to complete such logical inference of combination in practice. However, determination of Pt, and P;2 is much easier and the complexity of computation is much lower if Pt, and P;2 are used to combine 6 and 6. We believe that Pt, and Pi2 may give the lower and upper bounds (or vise versa) of the combination results of the other P12's. It may prob ably provide a new technique to the development of fast inference mechanism with possibilistic evidence.
